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Brian A. Korman 

The Corporate Game of Thrones and the
Market for Corporate Control

The market for corporate control is critical to the achievement of highly efficient
markets and provides a dire level of protection for non-controlling shareholders
as the market reallocates bargaining power from the hands of executives into the
hands of minority shareholders. This paper begins with a brief theoretical
discussion regarding the financial and societal benefits brought about by the
market for corporate control. Following this initial analysis, this manuscript will
progress by providing a step-by-step user’s guide for various players in the market
for corporate control including practical advice for an acquirer in pursuit of a
particular acquisition as well as methods for a corporation’s managers and
directors to fight off a hostile takeover attempt. In doing so, this text will begin
with various ways for an acquirer to structure and consider a takeover attempt
and will conclude with an overview of takeover defenses.
I. INTRODUCTION

The market for corporate control refers to a takeover market where
underperforming or undervalued firms become attractive takeover targets by
potential acquirers.1 This market often comes into play when a corporation’s
performance declines due to a failure within the corporation’s internal governance.2
Such failure could be attributable to the board of directors, the management team,
or both.3 To put it simply, when a company’s financial performance decreases over
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1.
Definition of Market for Corporate Control, LEXICON FINANCIAL TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/
Term?term=market-for-corporate-control (last visited Feb. 15, 2017); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965).
2.
Definition of Market for Corporate Control, supra note 1.
3.
Manne, supra note 1.
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The Corporate Game of Thrones and the Market for Corporate Control
time, it may reflect poor internal governance.4 This, in turn, invites external
governance players to infiltrate the corporate structure.5
Firms whose share prices are lower than they could be if managed by
more talented or highly motivated managers are attractive takeover targets.
By buying up enough shares to vote in a new board of directors, a bidder
can then replace an inefficient or ineffectual management team. The bidder
profits when the new management team gets results, which come in the
form of improved corporate performance, higher profits, and, ultimately,
higher share prices.6
One generally accepted goal of a takeover is to “revitali[z]e a poorly run
company and achieve higher profitability after restructuring.”7 This proposition, of
course, runs tangential to the potential acquirer’s belief that it can manage the
target firm more effectively than the existing management team.8
As an illustration, consider HBO’s hit TV series Game of Thrones.9 The show
depicts numerous Houses fighting to take over each other’s land in order to grow
their own empire.10 Consider each House its own corporation, and further consider
the family members of each House serving as the corporation’s management team.
For example, Cersei Lannister, Jaime Lannister and Tommen Baratheon are the
executives of House Lannister, which controls King’s Landing, the most prized asset
in Westeros. Also, think about Daenerys Targaryen operating as the CEO of House
Targaryen. If Daenerys Targaryen believed House Lannister was not operating
King’s Landing at its optimal level, she might vie to swoop in, take control and then
overthrow the management team. While this endeavor could yield bountiful results,
it may cost a bloody war.
Much debate has come to rise in the last half-decade regarding the market for
corporate control and its effect on the relationship between a corporation’s
shareholders and management team.11 Not surprisingly, shareholders and managers
have very different attitudes towards the market. The typical shareholder often
wants a corporation to be highly susceptible to a takeover because it keeps the
4.

Id.
Definition of Market for Corporate Control, supra note 1.
6.
Jonathan R. Macey, Market for Corporate Control, 2 LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY: THE CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/MarketforCorporateControl.html.
7.
Definition of Market for Corporate Control, supra note 1.
8.
Manne, supra note 1, at 113.
9.
Game of Thrones (HBO).
10.
Id.
11.
Manne, supra note 1, at 112, 117; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L. J. 698, 698 (1982) (discussing the differing views of managers and shareholders when
considering changes in corporate control).
5.
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managers disciplined and offers the shareholder a chance to receive a significant
premium if a takeover occurs.12 Conversely, managers are often far more resistant to
takeover attempts because such an attempt could place their job security at risk and
a post-takeover transition may cause a corporate executive to suffer significant
career setbacks.13 That said, since the late 1960’s, society has viewed the market for
corporate control as one that provides major benefits for the efficiency and
productivity of all corporations in every industry.14
It has been said, “a robust, properly functioning market for corporate control is
vital to the performance of a free-enterprise economy with public corporations.”15
The question however remains: why? What are the benefits of a market that allows
outsiders to enter a corporation with the sole purpose of overthrowing its leaders?
Sounds quite a bit like Game of Thrones, no? Henry G. Manne, American
economist, scholar, and Dean Emeritus at the George Mason University School of
Law,16 aptly coined this concept the “Market for Corporate Control” in his highly
acclaimed article Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control.17 Prior to Manne’s
1965 article, anti-trust laws dominated the market such that most large-scale
mergers were blocked by federal regulation, particularly those between
competitors.18 Through his pioneering efforts, Manne established three reasons,
which illustrate the importance of a properly functioning market for corporate
control.
First, Manne set forth the now-widely acclaimed proposition that an acquirer
might be motivated to effectuate a corporate merger for one of two reasons: (1)
reduce competition or (2) increase corporate efficiency through improvements in
management.19 Prior to Manne’s article, the former reason listed above was
conventionally one of the most accepted motivations behind acquiring another
company: to eliminate the competition in an effort to soak up market share.20 This
is why many mergers in the 1960’s were often treated as per se illegal under Federal

12.
Jordan M. Barry & John W. Hatfield, Pill and Partisans: Understanding Takeover Defenses, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 633, 640 (2012).
13.
Id.
14.
See Fred S. Mechesney, Manne, Mergers, and the Market for Corporate Control, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
245, 247, 251 (1999) (discussing the advancements brought on by Manne and the correlation between
managerial efficiency and market price).
15.
Macey, supra note 6, at 1.
16.
Henry G. Manne, ‘52, 1928-2015, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO: THE LAW SCHOOL (Jan. 20, 2015, 1:02
PM), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/accoladesandachievements/henry-g-manne-52-1928-2015.
17.
See Manne, supra note 1.
18.
See Macey, supra note 6, at 2, 6 (highlighting regulations such as The Williams Act, which effectively
limited large-scale mergers between competitors).
19.
Manne, supra note 1, at 112–13.
20.
See id. at 112.

Vol. 12, No. 2 2017

167

KORMAN PPv3 (DO NOT DELETE)

4/6/2017 4:22 PM
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anti-trust laws when challenged by the government.21 However, Manne intuitively
proposed an alternative motivation behind acquisition efforts, which is to purchase
a poorly performing corporation, revitalize the company’s operations, improve
performance, and turn a profit.22 Manne writes “[t]he lower the stock price, relative
to what it could be with more efficient management, the more attractive the takeover becomes to those who believe that they can manage the company more
efficiently.”23 This proposition illustrates how the market for corporate control
allows markets to operate at the highest level of efficiency. The market incentivizes
managers to lead with their best foot forward otherwise players in the market will
jump in and take control. This checks and balances-type of system keeps the efforts
of management and directors honest.
Secondly, Manne suggested that the market for corporate control is critical to
shareholder protection against poor business judgment by directors and managers.24
The business judgment rule leaves non-controlling shareholders at the whim of
corporate executive decision-making.25 Manne writes:
Apart from the stock market, we have no objective standard of managerial
efficiency. Courts, as indicated by the business-judgment rule, are loath to
second-guess business decisions or remove directors from office. Only the
take-over scheme provides some assurance of competitive efficiency and
thereby affords strong protection to the interests of . . . small, noncontrolling shareholders.26
The separation between ownership and control is one that can leave minority
shareholders in a bargain-less position, but “the market for corporate control gives
these shareholders both power and protection commensurate with their interest in
corporate affairs.”27

21.

See Macey, supra note 6, at 2 (discussing regulations aimed at limiting large-scale mergers).
Manne, supra note 1, at 113.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
See Carol Seidler, Assessing the Wisdom of the Business Judgment Rule in Corporate Control Contests: Is It
Time to Make Shareholders’ Interests Paramount?, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 919, 921 (1989) (discussing the business
judgment rule and its protection of director decision-making); see also Boland v. Boland, 31 A.3d 529, 548
(2011) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)) (maintaining that courts will presume that business decisions by a board of directors
are made on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company).
26.
Manne, supra note 1, at 113.
27.
Id. at 112.
22.
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Lastly, Manne’s third contribution was his proposition that managerial efficiency
should be objectively measured by only one factor: changes in share price.28 In order
for the first two propositions listed above to hold true, an objective measure of
managerial efficiency must be universally accepted. Manne posits “[a] fundamental
premise underlying the market for corporate control is the existence of a positive
correlation between managerial efficiency and the market price of shares of that
company.”29 If an existing company is being poorly managed—in the sense that
shareholders are not receiving as great returns as they could under better
management—the share price declines relative to industry competitors.30
Understanding that managerial efficiency is best measured by share price provides
unity among shareholders and managers by creating a common goal for all: high
share prices. If the share price is high, shareholders are happy and managers
continue to hold their jobs.31 Conversely, if the share price is low, a takeover can
unseat management while also providing shareholders a financial premium for their
troubles.32
Because ownership of most public companies is so widely dispersed,
shareholders and consumers depend on the market to provide an optimal level of
efficiency.33 Without an efficient market for corporate control, collective-action
problems often hinder any changes in management personnel when a management
team is underperforming. For example, a commonly known theory is the “freerider” problem, which posits that a single shareholder often does not monitor
management efficiency because the costs associated with doing so would be borne
solely on that individual shareholder, yet the benefits of unearthing and replacing
executives are reaped by all shareholders.34 Shareholders of closely held businesses
are lucky not to face this problem. “This free-rider problem leads to less than the
optimal amount of monitoring and other corrective action [and] the market for
corporate control is the only known antidote for . . . these collective action
problems.”35 Thus, the market for corporate control aids to bridge the gap between
the interests of shareholders and managers of any public corporation.

28.

Id. at 112–13.
Id. at 112.
30.
Id.
31.
See Kevin Haeberle, Stock-Market Law and the Accuracy of Public Companies’ Stock Prices, 2015 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 121, 134 (2015) (expressing that shareholders want the firm they own to maximize its value and
that the responsibility of doing so falls strictly upon the corporate managers).
32.
See Albert O. Saulsbury, IV, The Availability of Takeover Defenses and Deal Protection Devices for AngloAmerican Target Companies, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 115, 146 (2012) (pointing to various empirical studies showing
that premiums paid to shareholders in U.S. takeover deals generally exceed those paid in the U.K.).
33.
See Macey, supra note 6, at 1.
34.
Id.
35.
Id. at 3.
29.
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Therefore, the market for corporate control is critical to the achievement of
highly efficient markets and furthermore provides a dire level of protection for noncontrolling shareholders as the market reallocates bargaining power from the hands
of executives into the hands of minority shareholders. Whether you are playing
offense as an acquirer or you are playing defense to prevent a takeover, this
manuscript will guide readers through a roadmap for students and young
practitioners new to the market for corporate control who are eager to learn the
market’s basics. I begin with the offensive side of the market by discussing strategic
best practices for identifying and executing a takeover opportunity. I will then
switch to the defensive side of the market by providing an overview of takeover
defenses for managers and directors to employ in an effort to ward off hostile
takeover attempts.
II. PLAYING OFFENSE: MAKING A TAKEOVER ATTEMPT

When an opportunity arises for an acquirer to make an acquisition, there are many
ways for the acquirer to identify the takeover target. The process is common to
purchasing a new car. The type of car a person buys will depend on factual
distinctions unique to that consumer. For example, John might require a pickup
truck because he needs to haul heavy equipment, while Paul might need a sedan to
carry his family safely to each destination. The choices of each John and Paul are
driven by their current needs and anticipated outcomes. Similarly, Season 6 of
Game of Thrones concluded with Daenerys Targaryen having identified King’s
Landing as her next acquisition target.36 Throughout the show, she has generated
considerable value using the growth-by-acquisition model by taking Astapor,
Yunkai and Meereen.37 And, while she’s been quite successful in her endeavors, she
vies to expand her portfolio further by taking King’s Landing because of what it has
to offer.38 King’s Landing is cash rich, harbors the King’s throne, and, most
importantly, it is the city where her father ruled before the Baratheons rebelled and
took the throne.39 For these reasons, King’s Landing offers something to Daenerys
that no other target offers—the chance to be Queen.40 Furthermore, the
Lannisters—King’s Landing’s management—are as weak as they have ever been,
making the timing for a takeover attempt particularly enticing.41 Accordingly, the
manner in which an acquirer might identify and ultimately effectuate a takeover
opportunity will be dictated by firm-specific characteristics.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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Game of Thrones: Winds of Winter (HBO television broadcast June 26, 2016).
Game of Thrones (HBO).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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This section will begin by categorizing the most common takeover methods. It
will then move forward by setting forth guidelines for acquirers to implement in
identifying, valuing, and paying for a target firm, as well as the final and most
critical step in an acquisition: making the business work after the deal is complete.
A. Categorizing Acquisitions
Acquisitions in the market for corporate control can be broken down into three
broad categories: (1) friendly mergers, (2) hostile takeovers, and (3) buyouts. The
first two are considered external acquisitions because the acquirer is someone who
comes from outside the firm. Conversely, a buyout should be considered an
internal acquisition because the acquirer often comes from within the target firm.
Each of these categories has two subparts, which will be discussed within each
broader category. See Table 1 below for a summarization of the various categories.
Table 1: Acquisition Categories
External

Friendly
Merger

One Firm
Survives
(Usually
Acquirer)

Consolidation
External

Hostile
Takeover

Internal

Tender Offer
(Buying
Control)
Proxy Fight
(Voting)
Management

Buyout
Private Equity
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1. Friendly Merger
First, a friendly merger can be referred to hereinafter as a merger. In a merger, the
boards of directors of two firms agree to join together.42 Based on this definition, it
is easy for one to understand why this can be categorized as a “friendly deal.” In a
merger, shareholder approval will be required, which, in most cases, necessitates
approval by more than 50% of the shareholders of both the target and the bidding
firms.43 The result of a merger will come in the form of either a survivor or a
consolidation.44 If one firm survives the merger, it is said that one firm will absorb
the other firm.45 Most commonly, the acquiring firm will survive the merger and the
target firm will cease to exist, as it becomes part of the acquirer.46 The inverse could
also occur, in which case the target firm survives the merger and the acquirer would
cease its existence.47 While this is quite rare, a sound justification for surviving the
target would be if the target held strong brand recognition in the marketplace.
Conversely, in a consolidation, “a new firm is created after the merger, and both the
acquiring firm and target firm shareholders receive stock in this firm.”48 For
example, Citigroup was created as a result of a consolidation between Citicorp and
Travelers’ Insurance Group.49
2. Hostile Takeover
Alternative to a friendly deal is a hostile deal, which is the second acquisition
category. Presumably, once an acquirer identifies a target, the managers or directors
of the acquiring firm will approach those of the target to open discussions for a
friendly merger. If the target’s board of directors are not interested in selling, then
the acquiring firm can bypass the directors and managers and move in for a hostile
takeover. A hostile takeover is an acquisition accomplished not by coming to an
agreement with the target company’s management, but “by going directly to the

42.

ASWATH DAMODARAN, 2 CORPORATE FINANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 835 (2d ed. 2001).
Id.; see also Celia R. Taylor, “A Delicate Interplay”: Resolving the Contract and Corporate Law Tension in
Mergers, 74 TUL. L. REV. 561, 574–77 (1999) (discussing the merger process and how shareholder approval is
sought by individuals seeking corporate control).
44.
See DAMODARAN, supra note 42.
45.
19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2151 (2015); Ladjevardian v. Laidlaw-Coggeshall, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 834,
838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“A merger contemplates the ‘absorption of one corporation by another which retains its
name and corporate identity with the added capital, franchises and powers of a merged corporation.’”).
46.
19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2154 (2015).
47.
See 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(2)(e) (2006).
48.
DAMODARAN, supra note 42; see also Kirzhner v. Silverman, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1149, 1155 (D. Colo.
2012) (discussing the consolidation following a merger and the transfer of stock in the acquired company to
stock in the acquiring company); Ladjevarian, 431 F. Supp. at 838; 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2154 (2015).
49.
DAMODARAN, supra note 42.
43.
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company’s shareholders or fighting to replace management to get the acquisition
approved.”50
A hostile takeover can be accomplished through either a tender offer or a proxy
fight.51 In a tender offer, the acquiring firm offers to buy the outstanding stock of
the target firm at a specific price, which usually includes a premium above the
market price.52 The goal here is for the acquiring firm to directly purchase the
requisite number of shares to take control of the corporation (often 50.1%,
depending on shareholder voting provisions in the target’s corporate charter).53 If a
target’s shareholder base is made up of large institutional investors, a tender offer
could be an effective strategy for obtaining control because purchasing shares
directly from those investors allows for secrecy and negotiation on price.54 However,
tender offers are most commonly used in hostile takeovers where “shares are widely
held and there is a chance of a fast increase in market price if the news spreads that
there is a heavy buyer in the market for the [target]’s shares.”55 Importantly, the
tender offer will be executed only if a minimum percentage of shares are tendered at
the offered price, so the decision to sell is left solely to the shareholders.56 The tender
offer will not succeed and the target firm will not be acquired so long as enough
minority shareholders refuse to tender.57 If the acquirer successfully tenders control
of the target firm, the practical implication results in a merger.58

50.
Hostile Takeover, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hostiletakeover.asp (last
visited Feb. 15, 2017).
51.
Id.
52.
DAMODARAN, supra note 42. Case law has recognized seven elements, as deemed by the SEC, to be
characteristic of a tender offer:
(1) active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the shares of an issuer; (2)
solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer’s stock; (3) offer to purchase made at a
premium over the prevailing market price; (4) terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable; (5)
offer contingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares, often subject to a fixed maximum
number to be purchased; (6) offer open only a limited period of time; (7) offeree subjected to
pressure to sell his stock.
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823–24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982). A tender
offer typically involves a public offering consisting of a general, publicized bid by an individual or a group to
buy shares of a publicly owned company at a price substantially above the current market price. See Telenor
East Invest AS v. Altimo Holdings & Investment Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 2d 432, 442–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing
Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1985)).
53.
Hostile Takeover, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/h/hostile-takeover (last visited
Feb. 5, 2017).
54.
Manne, supra note 1, at 116.
55.
Id.
56.
Tender Offer, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/answers/tender.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
57.
DAMODARAN, supra note 42; see also Taylor, supra note 43, at 583 (stating that shareholders hold the
power to accept or reject tender offers, effectively holding the power in regards to approving a proposed
merger).
58.
DAMODARAN, supra note 42.
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Alternatively, an acquirer can win a hostile takeover by employing a proxy fight.
In a proxy fight, “the acquirer will persuade existing shareholders to vote out
company management so that the company will be easier to take over.”59 The goal
here is for the acquirer to persuade the existing target’s shareholders to join the
acquirer in voting out incumbent managers or directors.60 Also referred to as a
proxy contest or a proxy battle, the acquirer is heavily relying on its lobbying ability
to “whip” votes among existing shareholders.61
An interesting comparison can be drawn between how a proxy fight works and
the way in which Daenerys Targeryen took control of Meereen.62 When Daenerys
arrived at Meereen, the kingdom was divided into two classes: masters and slaves.63
The masters were controlling the kingdom while the citizens had been turned into
slaves. In order to take control of the kingdom, Daenerys launched a “proxy fight”
whereby she called on the citizens to choose their next ruler: her or the masters.64
Upon the promise of being freed from slavery, the citizens “voted” Daenerys in and
the masters were voted out.65 From that point forward, Daenerys Targaryen became
the ruler of Meereen.66 This simplified example helps to illustrate the way in which a
corporate raider might employ a proxy fight in order to gain influence on the
target’s board of directors for the purpose of replacing incumbent management.
It has been said that a proxy fight is among the most expensive and uncertain of
all takeover devices.67 For this reason, it is not uncommon for an acquirer to
combine a proxy contest with a tender offer.68 In fact, Harvard Professors Lucian

59.
Proxy Fight, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/proxyfight.asp (last visited Jan. 22,
2017); see also Proxy Contest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining proxy contest, which is also
known as proxy fight, as “a struggle between two corporate factions to obtain the votes of uncommitted
shareholders”).
60.
Wadman v. McBirney, 443 A.2d 978, 979 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982); Spotlight on Proxy Matters – The
Mechanics of Voting, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxymatters/voting_mechanics.shtml#what_is_proxy
(last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
61.
Dealbook, Revisiting the Proxy Contest, N.Y. TIMES: THE DEALBOOK WITH FOUNDER ANDREW ROSS
SORKIN (Mar. 2, 2009, 9:30 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/revisiting-the-proxy-contest/?_r=0;
see Spotlight on Proxy Matters – The Mechanics of Voting, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxymatters/
voting_mechanics.shtml#what_is_proxy (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
62.
Game of Thrones: Breaker of Chains (HBO television broadcast Apr. 20, 2014).
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Arthur Fleischer, Jr. & Robert H. Mundheim, Corporate Acquisitions by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
317, 320 (1967); Manne, supra note 1, at 114.
68.
See Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control,
THE HARV. JOHN. M. OLIN DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 1, 22–35 (2001), http://www.law.harvard.edu/
programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/336.pdf (analyzing the effectiveness of takeover bids coupled with proxy
battles).
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Bebchuk and Oliver Hart have made the case that combining proxy battles with
acquisition offers is far superior to either takeover device used alone.69
3. Buyout
The third and final acquisition category is called a buyout. Generally speaking, a
buyout is the purchase of a controlling interest in a company’s shares.70 However, a
buyout does not fit within either of the first two categories above because the
target’s management team or a group of private equity investors (e.g., venture
capital firm or angel investor) are serving as the acquirer.71 For this reason, a buyout
can be considered an internal acquisition, whereas mergers and hostile takeovers are
considered external acquisitions. A buyout is often effectuated using a tender offer.72
Buyouts of publicly traded companies are viewed as good investment opportunities
because, after the transaction, the new majority owners can take the company
private “so [they] can streamline operations and improve profitability away from
the public eye, and then take [the company] public at a much higher valuation
down the road.”73 These acquisitions are referred to as management buyouts
(“MBO”) if the firm’s managers are involved, and leveraged buyouts (“LBO”) if the
financing is derived primarily from debt or if the buyers use company assets as
collateral to obtain debt financing.74

69.

Id.
Buyout, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/buyout.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2017);
see also Buyout, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining buyout as “[t]he purchase of all or a
controlling percentage of the assets or shares of a business; the acquisition of control of a company by buying all
or most of its assets or shares”).
71.
DAMODARAN, supra note 42; see also Leveraged Buyout, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(explaining that a public corporation’s management or outside investors may purchase outstanding shares of
stock using borrowed funds).
72.
DAMODARAN, supra note 42. See Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 152–53 (2d Cir. 1992) for an
example of a proposed tender offer financed by debt.
73.
Management Buyout, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/video/play/management-buyout/
(last visited Jan. 26, 2017); see also Management Buyout, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining
management buyout as “[a] buyout of a corporation by its own directors and officers”); DAMODARAN, supra
note 42, at 835, 841 (explaining that an incentive for any type of acquisition including a management buyout
may be to either remove incumbent management or change existing management policies or practices to
increase the value of the firm); The Case for Going Private, THE ECONOMIST: CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (Jan. 23,
2003), http://www.economist.com/node/1548664 (describing that managers of private firms have more control
and face less scrutiny so they can make hard strategic decisions in the interest of improving the company’s
performance partly because of their ownership interest); Shayndi Raice, The Art of the IPO, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
12, 2012, 6:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203922804578080763596406112
(explaining that the company’s value is an important factor in determining the initial price offering for a
company).
74.
DAMODARAN, supra note 42. Compare Management Buyout, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(defining management buyout as “[a] buyout of a corporation by its own directors and officers”), with
Leveraged Buyout, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a leveraged buyout as “[t]he purchase of
70.
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B. Steps in an Acquisition
As aforementioned, there are many methods for completing an acquisition.
Whether the players are able to strike a friendly deal or choose to overthrow the
company’s king and his advisors through a hostile takeover, each acquirer must
determine how and where to invest his money. Aswath Damodaran, a Professor at
the New York University Stern School of Business, developed a step-by-step model
for ensuring an acquisition is a sound investment.75 Regardless of the acquirer’s
identity, position, or goals, he will have to think critically about these four basic
steps before making the acquisition.
Step 1 is to identify the motive for the purchase. In Step 2, the acquirer must
choose a target firm based on that motive and then value the anticipated benefit
from the acquisition. Step 3 requires the acquirer to develop a plan to finance the
purchase price. Finally, Step 4 looks into ways for turning that anticipated benefit
into actual profits by considering best practices for making the acquisition work
after the transaction.
1. Step 1 – Identify Your Motive
“The first [step in any acquisition] is the development of a rationale and a strategy
for doing [the acquisition].”76 The acquirer must ask himself, why am I doing this?
Dr. Stephen Covey famously said “Begin with the end in mind” in his book The 7
Habits of Highly Effective People.77 Before we can develop the best strategy for
making an acquisition, we must first decide what is motivating the acquisition in
the first place. Damodaran has identified five reasons a firm might make an
acquisition:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Create operating or financial synergy;
Take over poorly managed firms and change management;
Diversify to reduce risk;
Acquire undervalued firms;
Managerial self-interest.78

a publicly held corporation’s stock by its management or outside investors, financed mainly with funds
borrowed from investment bankers or brokers”).
75.
DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 838–39.
76.
Id. at 838; see also Jirsy Motis, Mergers and Acquisitions Motives 8–22 (Toulouse School of Economics
and University of Crete, 2007) (summarizing various motives for mergers and acquisitions).
77.
STEPHEN R. COVEY, THE 7 HABITS OF HIGHLY EFFECTIVE PEOPLE: POWERFUL LESSONS IN PERSONAL
CHANGE 104–05 (25th Anniversary ed. 2013).
78.
See DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 839–43.
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i. Create Operating or Financial Synergy
Damodaran explains, “[s]ynergy [is] the potential additional value from combining
two firms.”79 The synergy motive relies on the economic premise that the value of
the combined firm is greater than the sum of the values of the bidding and the
target firms, operating independently.80 Likely the most common rationale for
acquisition activity, an acquirer might seek synergy in two different forms:
operating synergy or financial synergy.81
“Operating synergies are those synergies that allow firms to increase their
operating income, increase growth or both.”82 There are three ways an acquisition
can create operating synergy: (1) Economies of scale (streamlining operations to
reduce costs and thereby increase profitability); (2) Increase pricing power
(reducing competition to obtain higher market share thereby increasing profit
margins); or (3) Purchasing functional strengths (e.g., a firm with strong marketing
skills acquires a firm with a good product line).83
Financial synergies work to increase cash flow or reduce the cost of capital.84 In
the context of mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”), three kinds of financial synergy
often motivate an acquisition depending on a particular acquirer’s situation: (1)
cash slack – when a firm that has a number of cash extensive projects acquires a
firm which is cash-rich, the new combined firm can enjoy profits from investing the
cash of one firm into the projects of the other; (2) increase in debt capacity –
combining two firms can create more stable cash flows, which allows the combined
company to borrow more (carry more debt);85 (3) tax benefits – a profitable firm
can acquire unprofitable firms with unused net operating losses to offset profits
thereby reducing its tax burden.86 These deleveraging efforts should reduce the cost
of capital for the combined firm.

79.
Id. at 840; see also Lennart Horst Michael Junge, Operating Synergy Types and Their Impact on PostMerger Performance 10 (School of Economics and Management, Tilburg University, ANR (791051), 2014)
(defining synergy as “the additional value created by combining two companies”).
80.
Mitchell B. Arden & Joseph Nappi, Post-Acquisition, Post-Merger: Driving Value Through Synergy, AM.
BANKR. INST., Jan. 2013, at 42.
81.
See id. at 42–43.
82.
DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 840.
83.
See id. (identifying four types of operating synergy). Although Damodaran identified four types of
operating synergy, the fourth type can be tied in with the third type.
84.
Id.
85.
Id. at 840–41.
86.
Id.; Charles L. Barnard, Acquisitions for Tax Benefit, 34 CAL. L. REV. 36, 37 (1946); Motis, supra note 76,
at 12.
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ii. Taking Control of a Poorly Managed Firm and Replacing the Managers
If synergy is the motive, a friendly deal is likely to result.87 Conversely, if the goal of
a takeover is to replace management and implement new policies, the acquirer is
likely to face pushback from the target’s existing managers.88 Cue the hostile
takeover. “Acquiring poorly managed firms and removing incumbent management
. . . should make these firms more valuable, allowing the acquirer to claim the
increase in value.”89 This increase in value is commonly referred to as the “value of
control” and corporate control has been increasingly cited as a reason for hostile
acquisitions.90 Damodaran describes three characteristics shared by a typical target
firm in a hostile takeover:
1.

2.
3.

It has underperformed other stocks in its industry and the
overall market, in terms of returns to its stockholders in the
years preceding the takeover;
It has been less profitable than firms in its industry in the
years preceding the takeover;
It has a much lower stock holding by insiders than do firms
in its peer groups.91

In theory, once the acquirer takes control, it can replace the incumbent
managers with a team that will make more efficient use of corporate assets. This
should increase profitability and the acquirer will begin to realize his gain.
iii. Diversify to Reduce Risk
A reduction in risk exposure provides another common motive for acquisition
activity. Diversification reduces an investor’s exposure to firm- or industry-specific
risk.92 “By buying firms in other businesses and diversifying, the managers of
acquiring firms believe they can reduce earnings volatility and risk, while increasing
potential value.”93 This motive is most common for family-owned businesses and

87.

See DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 842.
Id.
89.
Id. at 841; see also Manne, supra note 1, at 113; Motis, supra note 76, at 17.
90.
DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 841.
91.
Id. at 841–42.
92.
Beginner’s Guide to Asset Allocation, Diversification, and Rebalancing, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/
investor/pubs/assetallocation.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
93.
DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 839; see also Malcolm S. Salter & Wolf A. Weinhold, Diversification via
Acquisition: Creating Value, HARV. BUS. REV., July 1978, https://hbr.org/1978/07/diversification-via-acquisitioncreating-value; Motis, supra note 76, at 13, 19.
88.
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closely held firms where the managers have invested the bulk of their wealth in the
firm.94
iv. Acquire Undervalued Firms
If a publicly traded company’s stock price is trading at a value that the acquirer
knows is below its true value, there is profit to be gained. “Firms that are
undervalued by financial markets can be targeted for acquisition by those who
recognize this mispricing.”95 For this to work, the acquirer must be privy to
information unknown by other market participants and thus requires a great deal of
intuitive appeal. As such, this motive is a risky acquisition driver if the target is
traded on a large public stock exchange or other efficient markets. “The odds are
better in less efficient markets or when acquiring private businesses.”96
v. Managerial Self-interest
When an acquisition opportunity arises, the acquirer’s managers make the final call
regarding what to buy and how to buy it.97 Therefore, a motive behind some
acquisitions lies in the self-interest of those decision makers rather than the wealth
maximization of a firm’s shareholders.98 Aptly coined “machismo” by Professor
Damodaran,99 a manager’s ego may be the sole motivation for pursuing a particular
deal, whether the manager is internally motivated by having the largest, most
dominant firm in the market or is driven by his own competitive nature once a
bidding war ensues.100 Acquirers should be warned however that if “machismo” is
solely motivating the deal, it is quite likely that the bidder will overpay rendering
the deal a poor investment.101
2. Step 2 – Choose and Value Your Target
Once a firm has identified its acquisition motive, its managers must identify a
potential target that best satisfies its investment goals given the motive.
Additionally, the acquirer must determine how much it is willing to pay for the
target to ensure its managers don’t overpay. Part 1 of Step 2 is to choose a target

94.

See DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 840.
Id. at 839; see also Motis, supra note 76, at 17 (explaining the potential value of acquiring a firm that is
undervalued due to poor management).
96.
DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 839.
97.
Id. at 843.
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
100.
See id. (describing that sometimes acquisitions “become tests of machismo for the managers involved”
because neither side wants to lose the battle).
101.
Id.
95.
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firm.102 This choice should be very heavily dictated by the acquisition motive
identified in Step 1.
i. Choosing a Target
If the motive is synergy, the choice of target will depend on the source of that
synergy. For example, if the goal is to gain operational synergy and the firm’s plan is
to use the target to streamline operations to reduce costs (economies of scale), the
target should operate in the same business as the acquirer.103 If functional synergy is
sought, the target should be an industry leader in areas where the acquiring firm
needs improvement.104 For financial synergy, the target should possess the financial
make up that the acquirer is looking for.105 For example, if the acquirer holds cash
slack (excess cash), it should identify a target with high-yield projects but limited
cash. Similarly, if the acquirer is seeking tax benefits to shelter income, then it
should find a money-losing target with plenty of unused net operating losses.
If the motive is to obtain control in order to replace incumbent management,
“the target firm will be a poorly managed firm in an industry where there is
potential for excess returns.”106 Generally, a target ripe for takeover will have widely
dispersed stock holdings and the current market price should evidence no
indication that the existing managers will be replaced.107
If diversification is motivating the acquisition, the target should be in a business
that is unrelated and uncorrelated to that of the acquirer. For example, a firm
operating in a cyclical market is best served to try to acquire a counter-cyclical or, at
least, non-cyclical firm to get the most out of its investment.108 For example, an ice
cream stand could acquire a hot chocolate stand to increase sales in the winter
months. This would provide the business with year-round cash flows.
Lastly, if the acquisition motive is undervaluation, the target firm must be
trading below what the acquirer believes is the actual value of that target, and if the
motive is managerial self-interest, the choice of target will likely reflect managerial
interest rather than economic reasons.109
Once again, the target chosen by the acquiring firm should be selected because it
fits the acquisition motive, rather than some other reason. Importantly, if a firm has

102.

DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 843.
See id. at 844 (detailing that the typical target firm will vary when the motive for an acquisition is
operating synergy); Junge, supra note 79, at 5, 12–13 (illustrating that in general an acquisition of related
companies may allow for realization of economies of scale).
104.
See DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 844.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
103.
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more than one acquisition motive (e.g., control and synergy), then the selection of a
target should be guided by the leading motive.
ii. Valuing the Target
After the acquirer identifies the target that best suits its acquisition motive, the
managers must value the target firm, given the motive.110 While valuation
techniques are not within the scope of this paper, the basic goal of the valuation
process at this stage in the acquisition is to identify the value of the premium for
synergy or control.111 To do this, the bidder should first calculate the current value
of the target given its existing investing, financing, and dividend policies.112 Next,
the acquiring firm must determine the future value of the combined firm given how
the acquirer plans to use the target firm’s assets.113 For example, if the acquisition
motive is to take control of a poorly managed target and replace its managers, then
the bidder must determine which policies and practices will be altered once the new
managers are in place. It can then project the increased profitability that will result
from such changes to determine the value of the target firm with optimal
management. The difference between the value of the firm with optimal
management and the target’s current value is the value of the premium (in the
example, the value of control).114 Thus, the acquiring firm should not pay more than
the target’s current value plus the value of the premium, otherwise the acquirer will
overpay. Similarly, if the acquisition motive is focused on synergies, then the
acquirer should determine the value of that synergy and pay no more than the
current value of the target firm plus the value for synergy. Damodaran provides a
detailed and useful discussion of valuation techniques given various acquisition
motives.115
3. Step 3 – Financing the Acquisition
By the time the acquirer selects its potential target, the next phase in the acquisition
process is the structuring phase. In this stage of the process, the bidder must
determine how much to pay for the target and how to finance the purchase price.116
There are also various accounting and tax implications for the acquirer to consider
when deciding how to structure the deal, though this paper will not discuss
accounting and tax considerations.117
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 843–57 (outlining different methods of valuing the target firm).
Id. at 844–45.
Id. at 845.
Id. at 848.
Id. at 849.
See id. at 843–57 (walking through different firm valuation techniques).
DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 857.
See id. at 858–59.
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As explained above, the purchase price of any acquisition will reflect the current
value of the target combined with the value of the synergy or control premium.118
Thus, in determining how much to pay for the target, the acquirer should identify a
ceiling price it is willing to pay. “If the acquirer pays the full value, there is no
surplus value to claim for the acquirer’s [share]holders and the target firm’s
[share]holders get the entire value of the synergy and control premiums.”119 As
such, the acquirer is wise to pay less than full value in order to make efficient use of
corporate time and resources spent on the deal.
Next, the acquirer must determine how it will pay for the deal.120 The bidder can
finance the acquisition in one of two ways: debt or equity.121 Commonly, acquisition
consideration will include a combination of the two and the proper ratio used will
depend on the acquirer’s particular financial situation.122 First, if a firm wishes to
use debt to finance the purchase price, it must have debt capacity available
otherwise the cost of capital will absorb the premium value. Secondly, a firm could
fund the purchase price with equity. Damodaran has identified three ways in which
an acquirer can use equity to fund a transaction. The first is to spend cash if the
bidder has enough cash on hand.123 Alternatively, the bidder can issue a public
offering to raise sufficient cash to fund the acquisition.124 Thirdly, the acquirer can
use its own stock to fund the purchase price.125 This third option is called a stock
swap where shares in the acquiring firm are exchanged or “swapped” for shares in
the target firm.126 A stock swap may be the preferred payment method for target
companies because applicable U.S. laws allow for the target’s shareholder to defer
capital gains taxes on the exchanged shares.127 However, a stock swap can be a riskier
payment method than cash because the acquirer’s stock price can fluctuate between
the signing of the merger agreement and when the deal actually closes.128

118.

See supra notes 110–15 and accompanying text.
DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 857.
120.
Id. at 858.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Id.; Acquisition Payment Methods, ACCOUNTINGTOOLS (last visited Feb. 15, 2017) http://www.
accountingtools.com/acquisition-payment-methods.
124.
See DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 858.
125.
Id. (describing that an acquiring firm’s managers judge the perceived value of stock when it is issued to
raise funds or offered as payment on acquisitions).
126.
Id.
127.
Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 354 (1998) (stating that exchanges of stock pursuant to a corporate
reorganization are not to be recognized as a gain or a loss so long as the principal received does not exceed the
principal surrendered).
128.
See DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 858–59.
119.
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4. Step 4 – Making It Work Post-Closing
Once the deal closes and ownership is exchanged for the purchase price, the real
work begins. It is now up to the acquirer’s management team to deliver on the
promise of returns from the company’s investment. Not all mergers are success
stories. KPMG conducted a study in 1999 examining 700 merger deals between
1996 and 1998 in which it concluded “only 17% [of deals] created value for the
combined firm, 30% were value neutral, and 53% destroyed value.”129 Certain firms,
such as GE, Cisco and Browning Ferris, have made a name for themselves by
successfully increasing in value over time using a growth by acquisition business
model.130 What is it that makes firms like GE so effective in delivering the premium
value? Damodaran has identified a few trends from his research:
1.
2.

3.

4.

Firms that evaluate synergy carefully before an acquisition are
28% more likely to succeed than firms that do not;
Mergers involving firms of equal size have a lower probability
of succeeding than acquisitions of smaller firms by larger
firms;
Acquisitions focused on buying small private businesses for
consolidation have more success than acquisitions of publicly
traded firms;
Hostile acquisitions seem to deliver greater post-acquisition
returns than friendly deals.131

What prevents acquirers from achieving the goal that motivated the merger in
the first place? Damodaran pinpointed a few of the most common reasons for failed
mergers.132 Seemingly, the most common reason a merger fails can be linked to a
lack of a post-merger plan in order to deliver on synergy and control.133 “Firms in
many mergers seem to believe that the value enhancements associated with synergy
and control will arise on their own. In reality, however, firms must plan for and
work at creating these benefits.”134 In successful acquisitions, the acquirer is prudent
to develop a meticulous post-closing plan to monetize the premium.
Another common misstep occurs when the acquirer fails to consider external
constrictions such as unions or governmental restraints.135 For example, if a postclosing merger plan involves laying off an employee division, the new management

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 863.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 864–65.
Id. at 865–66.
Id. at 865.
DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 865.
Id. at 866.
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team will surely face pushback from target employee unions. Culture shock from
combining employees of one firm with another, lack of accountability, and
managerial egos have also been noted as common trends in failed mergers.136 In
sum, careful and diligent forethought in the very early stages of an acquisition is
critical to a successful merger.
III. PLAYING DEFENSE: AN OVERVIEW OF TAKEOVER DEFENSES

As described above, a corporate takeover can be friendly or hostile depending on
how the target company’s management team receives the bidder’s initial acquisition
offer.137 Many logical reasons can motivate a takeover such as anticipated synergies,
potential for revenue enhancements, likely reduced operating costs, and/or
beneficial tax treatments.138 However, various reasons exist for the management of a
target company to resist a takeover; for example, the managers might believe the
firm has hidden values unknown to the market.139 Alternatively, they might believe
resistance will increase the offer price and, of course, the ever-potential managerial
ego could affect a manager’s actions.140
While most corporate takeovers in the U.S. are friendly in nature,141 takeovers
can become hostile.142 If the target’s managers are not interested in entertaining a
bidder’s offer, the bidder can bypass the managers by making a tender offer directly
to the target’s stockholders.143 “This process happens over the opposition of the
target company’s management, and it usually leads to significant tension between
the target company’s management and that of the acquirer.”144 With this in mind,
managers of companies ripe for acquisition can employ certain defensive strategies
to deter unwanted acquisition advances. Such defense strategies can be bifurcated
with the offer itself serving as the dividing line between the two categories: Pre-offer
takeover defenses (alternatively, preemptive corporate defense strategies), and postoffer takeover defenses (alternatively, responsive corporate defense strategies).

136.

Id. at 865–66.
See supra notes 42–50 and accompanying text.
138.
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
139.
Richard S. Ruback, An Overview of Takeover Defenses, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 49, 51 (Alan J.
Auerbach, ed., 1987).
140.
Id. at 51–53.
141.
Troy Adkins, Warding Off Hostile Takeovers, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/
investing/041913/warding-hostile-takeovers.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
142.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
143.
See supra notes 52–58 and accompanying text.
144.
Adkins, supra note 141.
137.
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A. Pre-Offer Takeover Defense Strategies
This section describes several types of takeover defenses that a company’s managers
can put in place to ward off takeover attempts before the company is identified as a
potential target for acquisition. These strategies are considered preemptive because
they are most effective in deterring a takeover attempt before it happens, rather
than scaring a bidder away after it makes an offer.
1. Differential Voting Rights
A good preemptive line of defense for potential takeover targets would be to
establish stock securities that have differential voting rights (“DVRs”). Also
commonly called “dual class recapitalization,” these plans rework the firm’s equity
structure by dividing the equity into two classes with different voting rights145:
preferred shares and common shares. The preferred shares may have superior
voting rights, e.g., ten votes per share, while the common shares may have inferior
voting rights, e.g., one vote per share. The preferred shares will be distributed to all
shareholders but can then be exchanged for common shares, which will carry higher
dividends or increased marketability; this induces shareholders to exchange their
preferred shares (with superior voting rights) for more common shares (with
inferior voting rights but increased marketability).146 “This shifts the voting power
of the corporation. Managers with relatively small equity holdings can control a
majority of the votes after recapitalization. This gives managers veto rights over
control changes.”147 This can be a very effective preemptive strategy because even if a
bidder acquires all of the target’s equity, it would lack a sufficient number of votes
to replace the incumbent managers or cause the target to merge with the bidder
firm.
2. Employee Stock Ownership Plan
Another preemptive move a company can make is to establish an Employee Stock
Ownership Plan (“ESOP”). This is a tax-qualified retirement plan that provides a
company’s workforce with stock ownership in the company.148 Often provided at no
up-front cost to the employees, these plans offer tax savings to both the corporation
and the shareholders.149 By establishing an ESOP, employees of the corporation hold
ownership in the company, which, in turn, “means a greater percentage of the
company will likely be owned by people that will vote in conjunction with . . . the

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Ruback, supra note 139, at 60.
Id.
Id.
Adkins, supra note 141.
Id.
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target’s management rather than with the . . . potential acquirer.”150 An ESOP is
beneficial because it can increase employee morale, build camaraderie within the
organization, and encourage employees to side with the managers if a corporate
raider enters the picture.151
3. Super-majority Voting Provisions
Most corporate charters provide for a simple majority (50.1%) to approve a
merger.152 A super-majority corporate charter amendment would increase the
requisite approval threshold.153 By requiring a higher percentage of shares to
approve a merger, sometimes as much as 80%, hostile takeover bidders are forced
to obtain more votes to take control of the target firm.154 This, in effect, can make
the acquisition more expensive by requiring a more enticing offer to the
shareholders.
4. Golden Parachutes
A golden parachute is a benefits package “given to top executives in the event that
the company is taken over by another firm and the executives are terminated as a
result of the takeover.”155 Benefits can include stock options, cash bonuses, and hefty
severance pay.156 These packages provide a layer of takeover defense because the
would-be-acquirer is forced to fund the exit payout costs under with the golden
parachute contracts. This, in turn, increases the costs of taking control of a
company and replacing incumbent managers.

150.

Id.
Larry Myler, An Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) Could Increase Employee Engagement And
Promote Intrapreneurship – Here’s How, FORBES (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymyler/
2013/10/11/an-employee-stock-ownership-plan-esop-could-increase-employee-engagement-and-promoteintrapreneurship-heres-how/#3a400cb830b5.
152.
See Types of Mergers and Acquisitions: U.S. Legal Highlights, STERN SCH. OF BUS. AT N.Y.U.,
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/igiddy/reorganization.htm (stating that mergers generally require the approval of a
majority of shareholders in the target and the acquiring company).
153.
See DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 867.
154.
Ruback, supra note 139, at 57; Donald J. Evans et al., Model Business Corporations Act: Implications for
Takeover Contests, 42 ABA BUS. LAW. 575, 578 (1986-87) (explaining that the Model Business Corporations Act
as well as all but three states, now have provisions allowing for super majority provisions in corporate charters).
155.
Golden Parachute, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/goldenparachute.asp (last
visited Feb. 15, 2017); 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2167 (2015) (defining Golden Parachute as a benefits
package given to “senior executives who are dismissed, or in certain circumstances, resign as a result of a
takeover”).
156.
Golden Parachute, supra note 155.
151.
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5. Staggered Board Election
A staggered board of directors is a board that is made up of different classes of
directors.157 Also known as a classified board, this charter provision classifies board
members into, for example, three groups and each year only one group is up for reelection.158 “This makes it difficult for a hostile bidder to gain immediate control of
the target firm, even if the bidder owns a majority of the common stock.”159 Thus,
when a hostile bidder tries to acquire a company with a staggered board, it must
wait at least one year—and sometimes more—before it can gain control of the
board to implement its new corporate agenda. This limitation can decrease the
bidder’s willingness to bid and can also provide an additional obstacle in the
bidder’s efforts to obtain financing.160
6. Poison Pill
The poison pill lies at the forefront of takeover defense controversy since the
Delaware Supreme Court’s 1985 decision upholding the plan’s legality.161 “The key
concept behind the poison pill is that it deters a potential acquirer from purchasing
the stock of the target by making a takeover unprofitable.”162 Poison pills often
come in one of two forms. A “flip-in” plan allows existing shareholders (excluding
the acquirer) to buy more shares of the target’s stock at a price considerably below
market value.163 By allowing existing shareholders to purchase additional shares at a
severely discounted price, the investors get instant profits and, more importantly,
the acquirer’s shares become diluted making the takeover attempt more
unattractive and expensive.164 Conversely, a “flip-over” plan allows shareholders to
purchase shares in the acquiring company at a discounted price after the merger.165
For example, target shareholders would gain the right to buy stock in the acquirer’s
company on a two-for-one basis in any subsequent merger. In a poison pill, these
purchasing rights remain inactive until “triggered” by the target’s board. A
triggering event would occur when an outside bidder obtains a threshold block of
shares, for example, 20% of the company’s outstanding shares.166

157.

See DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 867.
Ruback, supra note 139, at 56; Evans, supra note 154, at 577 (indicating that the Model Business
Corporation Act allows for staggered boards).
159.
Ruback, supra note 139, at 56.
160.
Id. at 57.
161.
Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Del. 1985).
162.
See Barry & Hatfield, supra note 12, at 642.
163.
Id.
164.
Adkins, supra note 141; 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2172 (2015) (explaining that poison pills dilute
the value of the acquirer’s holdings).
165.
See Barry & Hatfield, supra note 12, at 642.
166.
Ruback, supra note 139, at 58.
158.
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Both forms of the poison pill are considered severe takeover defenses because
they can insulate incumbent managers completely from hostile takeovers and the
resulting effect is a stark devaluation of the firm’s equity. It should also be noted
that the effectiveness of a poison pill can increase substantially if combined with a
staggered board, as described above. “Hostile bidders that manage to win one seat
allow staggered boards the opportunity to defend the company they represent
against the takeover by implementing a poison pill tactic to further deter the
takeover, effectively guaranteeing continuity of management.”167 It should further
be noted that the poison pill is considered a preemptive strategy because companies
most often have the plan in place long prior to a takeover attempt.168 However, the
pill would not be triggered until the takeover attempt is underway. It is also possible
for a company to quickly pass a poison pill plan in response to a takeover attempt,
though such action is likely to result in shareholder suits against the managers and
directors due to fiduciary constraints.169 For this reason, the poison pill may be
considered a responsive plan.
B. Post-Offer Takeover Defense Strategies
These types of defensive takeover strategies are ones that can be executed only after
a company is identified as a potential takeover target by a bidder. Commonly
referred to as responsive strategies, companies are poised to employ these devices to
ward off a potential bidder after the bidder makes its initial move.
1. Greenmail
The first responsive takeover defense strategy, known as greenmail, refers to a
targeted repurchase where a company buys a block of its own stock from an
167.
What is a Staggered Board?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/05/
staggeredboard.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2017); supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text.
168.
See, e.g., Eric Posner & Glen Weyl, How to Make Poison Pills Palatable, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2013),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/how-to-make-poison-pills-palatable/?_r=0 (demonstrating how
Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation divided into two entities and inserted a poison pill defense into their
charters to shield them from hostile takeovers).
169.
When directors take defensive action against a hostile takeover there is enhanced scrutiny requiring
the directors to show that: 1) they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy or
effectiveness existed; and 2) the response was reasonable and proportional to the threat. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). To satisfy the first prong the directors must articulate the
perceived threat and show they acted with “good faith and reasonable investigation.” Air Products and
Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 92 (Del. Ch. 2011). The second prong examines the response and
asks whether it was preclusive or coercive and if not whether it was proportional to the threat posed. Unitrin,
Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995). This burden will inevitably be made tougher
if the poison pill is passed after a takeover has begun, as demonstrating good faith and reasonable investigation
requires a showing of deliberate process and consideration, which is undermined when time is constrained. If
the board fails to meet the prongs of the Unocal test, they will not have business judgment protections and will
need to show entire fairness. Id. at 1377 n.18.
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individual investor or small group of investors, usually at a substantial premium.170
In essence, the target company is inducing the acquiring firm to withdraw its offer
and sell the newly acquired shares back to the target firm at a profit.171 One of the
first instances of this takeover defense came in 1979 when Carl Icahn purchased
9.9% of Saxon Industries stock for $7.21 per share.172 In response, Saxon
repurchased its own shares from Icahn at $10.50 per share to prevent Icahn’s
takeover plans.173 While greenmail can be an effective responsive takeover defense
because it seeks to eliminate the hostile bidder, it can be extremely expensive for the
target company as evidenced in the Icahn-Saxon example above.174 Additionally,
corporate raiders are becoming increasingly less likely to accept greenmail offers
due to the imposition of capital gains tax on gains derived from these types of
hostile takeover tactics.175
2. White Knight
Another responsive takeover tactic is for the target company to create an alliance
with an investor known as a white knight.176 A white knight is a friendly investor
who, with the support of the target’s board, acquires the target’s controlling shares
before the hostile bidder does so.177 Typically, the white knight agrees to pay a
premium above the hostile acquirer’s offer and, after the acquisition, will
restructure the company in a manner supported by the target’s managers.178 The
difficulty in this strategy is finding an acquirer to serve as the white knight. By
entering the picture after a hostile bidder’s offer, a white knight could start a
bidding war, which can make the acquisition price exceedingly high.
3. Asset and Liability Restructuring
The key principle to this final responsive takeover strategy is to make the company
less attractive in hopes that the bidder will rescind its tender offer.179 There are
170.
See Adkins, supra note 141; 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2214 (2015) (explaining that “greenmail”
refers to a defensive tactic of buying the acquirer’s shares in the company at a premium to thwart the takeover
attempt).
171.
See DAMODARAN, supra note 42, at 867.
172.
See Adkins, supra note 141.
173.
Id.
174.
PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURINGS 198 (4th ed. 2007).
175.
Adkins, supra note 141; see 26 U.S.C. § 5881 (2004) (setting tax rates on profits from “greenmail”
transactions).
176.
See GAUGHAN, supra note 174, at 197.
177.
Id. at 205.
178.
See Adkins, supra note 141; 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2179 (2015) (deciphering the phrase “white
knight” to mean a friendly investor and alternative acquirer who will support the company’s current
management).
179.
See GAUGHAN, supra note 174, at 197.
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various ways for a potential target company to accomplish this depending on firmspecific characteristics. First, the target could alter its asset structure by divesting
assets the bidder wants (commonly referred to as the “Crown Jewel” defense),
purchasing assets the bidder does not want, or purchasing assets that would create
antitrust or regulatory problems for the bidder.180 The aforementioned crown jewel
defense can be combined with the white knight defense where the target sells its key
asset(s) to a friendly bidder thus preventing the hostile bidder from obtaining the
asset(s). Alternatively, the target could restructure the right side of its balance sheet
by incurring needless debt, spending excess cash, or issuing voting securities to
friendly hands thereby increasing the number of shares required by a hostile
bidder.181
Regardless of a management team’s reason for fighting a takeover attempt, a
careful selection of defensive strategy is paramount. Consider the situation in which
Cersei Lannister has found herself at the conclusion of Season 6 of Game of
Thrones.182 Daenerys Targaryen is coming for Cersei’s seat with great fury.183 Cersei
could employ the crown jewel defense by selling the Throne to another House. Of
course, she would rather die than give up the Throne so this is an unlikely option.184
She might also consider aligning herself with a white knight. Unfortunately for
Cersei, she has made far more enemies than friends, which leaves her mostly alone
in her endeavors.185 Lastly, she can always stand her ground and fight toe-to-toe
with Daenerys in an attempt to win the proxy fight or convince her shareholders—
the citizens of King’s Landing—to decline Daenerys’ tender offer. In any event, the
Lannisters seem to have found themselves in a precarious position with Daenerys,
Varys and Tyrion Lannister coming for the Iron Throne.
IV. CONCLUSION

A plethora of takeover defense strategies exist across the board for corporate
managers and directors to oppose hostile takeover attempts. However, a larger
question remains regarding a manager’s fiduciary duty to his shareholders. Not
surprisingly, shareholders and managers often have different attitudes toward the
market for corporate control. Shareholders are generally in favor of ensuring the
company is susceptible to a takeover because such a possibility keeps the managers
disciplined and, if a takeover does occur, the shareholders nearly always stand to
receive a significant premium on their investment. Managers, on the other hand,

180.
Ruback, supra note 139, at 64; 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2162 (2015) (exploring the “crown jewel”
defense which involves disposing of the business’ main asset to make the acquisition less appealing).
181.
Ruback, supra note 139, at 64.
182.
Game of Thrones: Winds of Winter (HBO television broadcast June 26, 2016).
183.
Id.
184.
Id.
185.
Id.
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have almost diametrically opposite incentives, as they would prefer that their
actions be wholly unconstrained. Beyond that, most managers of publicly traded
companies stand to lose their jobs if a takeover occurs. If, however, a management
team elects to fight a hostile takeover attempt, a few things should be noted about
the strategies discussed above.
First, any defense that allows incumbent managers to hold a veto to hostile offers
is alarming for any shareholder.186 Poison pills and DVRs, while quite effective in
terms of fighting off the hostile bidder, prevent the market for corporate control
from running efficiently. Second, defenses that purposely destroy a company’s
balance sheet are dangerous.187 Asset and liability restructuring can be effective in
certain instances, however shareholders stand to suffer significant losses once key
assets are sold or needless debt is incurred. Lastly, defenses that inhibit managers
from holding takeover veto rights and do not destroy the firm’s balance sheet, for
example, staggered boards, ESOPs, super-majority voting provisions, and other
“shark repellant amendments” likely do not harm the shareholders’ investment
position and thus are good defenses to use. It is important to note that any takeover
defense can act to reduce the market’s efficiency. However, these efficiency metrics
fail to account for human emotion, which is of course a critical component for
those in charge of corporations when such grave decisions must be made. With
American capitalism and all of its greed, the market for corporate control can be a
perilous place. After all, “when you play the Game of Thrones, you win or you die.
There is no middle ground.”188

186.

Ruback, supra note 139, at 65.
Id.
188.
Game of Thrones: You Win or You Die (HBO television broadcast May 29, 2011) (quoting Cersei
Lannister in her final confrontation with Eddard Stark).
187.
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